High Court Cannot Condone Delay Beyond Section 107(4) Limit — Writ Filed Three Years After Assessment Order Is Not Entertainable Under Article 226: Patna HC Lays Down Comprehensive Framework

The Patna High Court has delivered a comprehensive ruling holding that a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an assessment order under the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act cannot be entertained when filed beyond the statutory period for filing an appeal — and that the High Court cannot, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, condone the delay in filing a statutory appeal beyond the 30-day limit prescribed under Section 107(4) of the BGST Act. The ruling was delivered by Justices Anil Kumar Sinha and Vikash Kumar on 14.07.2026 in CWJC No. 6180 of 2026.

M/s MK Traders, a cement dealer, was served with an assessment order under Section 73(9) dated 07.02.2023. The dealer filed an appeal on 02.04.2024 — over 13 months late. The appellate authority rejected the appeal on limitation, holding it had no power to condone delay beyond 30 days under Section 107(4). Instead of filing a second appeal before the GST Tribunal, the dealer filed a writ petition on 24.03.2026 — nearly three years after the assessment order — contending that the order had not been properly communicated and the Tribunal was not available.

The court framed two issues: (i) whether the writ is entertainable given the delay and availability of alternative remedy, and (ii) whether the High Court can condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 107(4).

On the first issue, the court mapped the entire timeline architecture of the BGST Act — from GSTR-1 filing (10th of next month) to GSTR-3B (20th of next month) to annual return (31st December) to rectification window (30th November) to ITC availment (Section 16(4)) to Section 73/74 assessment to Section 107 appeal. The court held that the legislature has created a deliberate, interlocking timeline scheme and entertaining a writ filed three years later would frustrate the legislative intent and render the scheme otiose. The court relied squarely on the Supreme Court's ruling in Glaxo Smith Kline [(2020) 19 SCC 681], which held that the High Court should not entertain a writ filed beyond the statutory appeal period.

On the second issue, the court held — citing the Supreme Court's categorical pronouncement in Glaxo Smith Kline (Para 16 and 18) — that "what this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in reference to Article 226." The limitation period under Section 107(4) is mandatory, not directory, and the High Court cannot circumvent it through writ jurisdiction. The court also noted Section 162 of the BGST Act which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts except under Sections 117 and 118, reinforcing the legislative intent to channel all disputes through the statutory appellate machinery.

The ruling concludes by noting its consistency with earlier Patna HC decisions in Vishwanath Traders (affirmed by SC), Adarsh Construction and D.K. Jamuar — and formulates the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 against BGST Act orders is available only in exceptional circumstances (fundamental rights breach, NJ violation, jurisdictional excess, vires challenge) and never when filed beyond the statutory appeal period.